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STEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF LAW 
Jill M. Fraley* † 
ABSTRACT 
Bruce Ackerman’s recent book, The Decline and Fall of the American 
Republic, is a sudden shift from his previous scholarship on constitutional 
moments and the ability of social movements to generate minor revolu-
tions. By acknowledging how constitutional change did not fit into his 
model of deliberate, deeply debated movements, Ackerman has shifted the 
scholarly lens to unintentional and unanticipated structural variations. 
Ackerman focuses his book on the political processes and events that have 
fostered potentially illegitimate constitutional remodeling. He acknowledg-
es that certain features of legal scholarship have contributed to a lack of 
awareness of slow, structural drift, but he does not address the question in 
earnest, as I do in this Essay. 
My intention is not only to explain how features of legal scholarship 
have failed to make us aware of structural constitutional drift but also to 
use the Essay as an object lesson to prove the possibility of interesting, 
original, and readable scholarship on slow, structural change. To accom-
plish this task, I use original research from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presi-
dential Archives to tell a story of stealth change in our constitutional 
structures when the Appalachian Regional Commission was established. 
 
In The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, Professor Acker-
man calls for constitutional thought to ―rethink its own bounda-
ries.‖1 He diagnoses the problem as scholarship that ―remains fo-
cused narrowly on the judiciary and fails to appreciate that our most 
 
*- B.A., Yale University; J.D., Duke University School of Law; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law 
School. Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. The author is 
grateful for the comments and reflections of Robert W. Gordon, Bruce Ackerman, James 
Fowkes, Brendan Lim, and Jacklyn Neo. 
†- Due to the unique nature of the research conducted for this Essay, some sources cited 
herein were unavailable for review by the Drexel Law Review but have been verified by the  
author.   
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 181 (2010). 
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serious constitutional problems lie elsewhere.‖2 Such a diagnosis 
mirrors a doctor‘s finding of a gastrointestinal ailment—while accu-
rate, the lack of specificity is frustrating. In this Essay, I reflect on 
why a focus on the judiciary undermines our ability to recognize a 
trajectory of constitutional change in our structures and institutions 
and why certain features of historical and constitutional scholarship 
contribute to this failure. 
In light of Ackerman‘s concern about the role of White House 
Counsel, I propose my arguments through analyzing an episode in 
American legal history where, rather than twisting law to meet pres-
idential demands, in-house counsel warned the President about the 
dangers of structural constitutional changes: the creation of and 
amendments to the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). I do 
not intend to disprove Ackerman‘s thesis regarding the power of 
executive counsel, but rather to use an episode where counsel‘s 
warnings were ignored to highlight constitutional change through 
other mechanisms and tendencies.3 
In particular, the ARC story demonstrates how the focus on the 
judiciary constrains constitutional thought to the question of a viola-
tion, and moreover, a violation of a specific constitutional provision. 
I suggest that this framework also creates a problem for effectively 
monitoring structural constitutional change. By operating in the 
framework of violations, we place the debate in a dichotomous 
framework: violation or no violation. Although higher court opin-
ions are increasingly fractured and multifaceted, the question is 
framed fundamentally as yea or nay. As a result, even while our sys-
tem is based on precedent, there is a limited awareness of trajectory. 
Incremental changes in our constitutional structures accumulate 
slowly and remain unnoticed as rights downplay opportunities for a 
considered evaluation of institutions. 
As scholars and legal historians we are drawn to narrative histo-
ry—to the details of lives and events. But in writing about the power 
of social movements, we neglect to recognize that social movements 
are also capable of producing unanticipated and unintentional struc-
tural constitutional changes. In the case of Appalachia, national out-
rage over poverty and inequality in the region placed President 
Johnson in a position where he felt unable to veto regional commis-
 
2. Id. 
3. This analysis supports Ackerman‘s claim, in his rebuttal to Professor Morrison, that we 
cannot expect executive counsel ―to defend the rule of law when other institutional dynamics 
are propelling the presidency down a path toward illegality[.]‖ Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside 
the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 15 (2011). 
 
2012] STEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 469 
 
sion legislation; this pressure persisted even while internal memo-
randa indicated that the Administration was deeply concerned 
about constitutional questions related to the creation of a new gov-
ernmental structure that did not fit the traditional federal-state 
model and was not clearly accountable within the system.4 Notes 
from the end of his Presidency indicate that Johnson was deeply 
concerned over the lack of public interest in—or even awareness 
of—the vast expansion of the federal bureaucracy that had occurred 
during his tenure.5 
In the beginning, though, Johnson jumped at the chance to recon-
sider governmental structures in light of ―problems of unusual 
magnitude: mass education, hard core poverty both urban and ru-
ral, urban blight and renewal, air and water pollution, transporta-
tion.‖6 Such issues simply did not, in President Johnson‘s words, 
―respect State or county boundaries.‖7 For the Johnson Administra-
tion, the crisis encompassed more than a catalog of urban and rural 
challenges; these issues reflected a more fundamental quandary: 
how to administratively and democratically structure solutions  
given the ―irrationalities of present State and local jurisdictional 
boundaries.‖8 
Within a republican, federalist system, such boundaries are, of 
course, not simply lines on a map; the state lines and their accompa-
nying arrangements for governance are embedded in the Constitu-
tion. Addressing such problems immediately brought changes that 
were centrally, as the National Conference of Governors put it in 
their 1967 resolutions, plans for ―Constitutional Revision and Gov-
ernmental Reorganization.‖9 
 
4. See Memorandum from Harold Seidman, Assistant Dir. for Mgmt. Org., Budget Bureau, 
(Nov. 12, 1963) (Presidential Papers, Legislative Background, ARDA, Box 1, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter Memorandum from Harold Seidman]. 
5. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech 8 (Harry McPherson‘s unpublished notes of a 
speech delivered by President Johnson) (Aides Files, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 55, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter McPherson‘s unpublished notes 
on Johnson‘s Speech]. 
6. THE NEW FEDERALISM (Mar. 1967) (unpublished White House pamphlet) (Aides Files, 
Office Files of Charles Maguire, Box 3, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [here-
inafter THE NEW FEDERALISM]. 
7. Id. (quoting President Johnson‘s address to the governors at the Conference on Federal-
State Relations at the White House on March 18, 1967). 
8. Memorandum from Charles L. Schultze, Exec. Office of the President, Bureau of the 
Budget, to Joe Califano (Sept. 12, 1967) (Aides Files, Office Files of Gaither, Box 3, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) (emphasis removed from original). 
9. NAT‘L GOVERNORS‘ CONFERENCE, RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED (1967). 
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Johnson concluded that the only option was, ―a new kind of Fed-
eralism,‖ a ―creative federalism,‖ which was ―never contemplated 
by our Founding Fathers.‖10 Johnson and his supporters argued, 
first, that the federal system had always been changing to accom-
modate new social circumstances, and, second, that new social prob-
lems resulting from vast economic growth and the extraordinary 
development of local and metropolitan governmental structures ne-
cessitated structural changes.11 
With respect to the first argument, the Administration sought 
supportive, but abstract, quotes from former Presidents and found-
ing fathers and incorporated these into pamphlets and speeches. 
The Administration offered precedents such as the Morrill Act of 
1862, which was argued to be ―an example of enlightened Federal 
action in behalf of the states.‖12 Relying on these examples, the Ad-
ministration claimed that ―creative federalism is not a new concept. 
Indeed it has been a functioning reality for many, many years.‖13 
The overall plan was to convince the public that, ―we had moved 
more flexibly than most of us recognized to make our pluralistic sys-
tem work.‖14 Johnson specifically cited instances in the national his-
tory when federalism had moved flexibly, entangling state and fed-
eral government to meet a particular crisis. Johnson cited President 
Roosevelt‘s use of the general welfare clause to create grants-in-aid 
to the states.15 He also cited the role of World War II in changing 
government contracts so that they would be more flexible and could 
create partnerships with both industry and universities for the sake 
of national defense.16 
 
10. SELMA J. MUSHKIN & ROBERT F. ADAMS, STATE-LOCAL FINANCES PROJECT EMERGING 
PATTERNS OF FEDERALISM 12–14 (1966). This statement was repeated frequently in the press. 
See, e.g., Aides Files, Office Files of Ceil Bellinger, Box 4, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Aus-
tin, Texas (containing assorted newspaper articles referencing the statement). 
11. See MUSHKIN & ADAMS, supra note 10. Subsequently, a shorter version of the article was 
published in the National Tax Journal. Selma J. Mushkin & Robert F. Adams, Emerging Patterns 
of Federalism, 19 NAT‘L TAX J. 225, 225–47 (1966). 
12. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech on the Federal Government‘s Relations with 
State and Local Government and the Private Sector 4 (Aides Files, Office Files of Harry 
McPherson, Box 55, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter President 
Johnson‘s Private Sector Speech]. 
13. Orville L. Freeman, Sec‘y of Agric., U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., Address at the Legislative 
Conference of National Association of Counties: The Need for Rural-Urban Balance 9 (Feb. 27, 
1967) (Aides Files, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 358, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 
Austin, Texas). 
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A Council of State Governments staff paper, Mechanisms for Inter-
governmental Cooperation, provided more concrete legal precedents, 
particularly by calling upon scale precedents for regional govern-
ance, including: informal cooperation, interstate compacts, intergov-
ernmental commissions, administrative agreements, interstate con-
tracts, and reciprocal and uniform statutes.17 The report praised 
what had been accomplished through such mechanisms, but also 
more generally explained how those mechanisms established a legal 
basis for proposing new changes in the federal structure.18 The re-
port pointed out that Interstate Compacts, which had been used na-
tionally for such purposes as agreements to supervise parolees and 
probationers across borders, had also been frequently used regional-
ly to deal with a specific problem that ran across borders.19 The re-
port cited examples from metropolitan areas such as New York, 
Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Kansas City, and offered examples of 
the problems being address by such compacts, including construc-
tion of transportation facilities, pollution control, and operation of 
interstate parks.20 Even more specifically, the report noted that there 
were also compacts between a group of bordering states and the 
federal government, such as the Delaware River Basin Compact.21 
The report skipped over constitutional questions, finding that such 
arrangements could be put into action by simply creating coordinat-
ing legislation in the states and the federal government.22 According 
to the report, ―It is legally possible to use a compact for any kind of 
joint or cooperative intergovernmental undertaking, simply because 
it is possible to write almost anything into statutes and contracts.‖23 
This approach took advantage of our preoccupation with rights, 
skipping over questions of the constitutionality of structural  
changes. 
On the other hand, even without precedent, novel problems were 
considered sufficient reason for novel solutions. With all due respect 
to the founding fathers, the Johnson Administration was positive 
 
17. Staff Paper, Council of State Gov‘ts, Comm. on Reg‘l & Interstate Cooperation, Mecha-
nisms for Intergovernmental Cooperation 2–5 (1967) (Aides Files, Office Files of Gaither, Box 
8, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter Mechanisms for Intergovern-
mental Cooperation]. 
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 2–3. 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 3. 
23. Id. 
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that ―[i]n the 179th year of our Federal Union, our remarkable sys-
tem of government is confronted by problems of a kind and a mag-
nitude never imagined by the drafters of the Constitution.‖24 The 
heart of the argument, as summarized by Congressman Fountain of 
North Carolina in a speech to the National Association of Counties, 
was that ―[c]hanging conditions give rise to demands for new and 
expanded activities, . . . and these, in turn, necessitate interlevel ad-
justments if a federal system is to operate successfully.‖25 A headline 
in the New York Times captured this moment in history: ―Nation is 
Warned Unrest in Cities Imperils System.‖26 
Modernity was to blame for any limit in choices. ―One choice that 
is not available to us is to continue the old system of unmanageable 
city government, inadequate State government, an uncoordinated 
Federal Government[,] and disjointed relations between Federal, 
State[,] and local levels.‖27 As Health, Education, and Welfare Secre-
tary John W. Gardener argued to the press in 1967, creative federal-
ism was required ―to replace a ‗dying, or dead‘ system.‖28 In the 
words of Congressman Fountain of North Carolina: ―The challenge 
is now ours to discover practicable new methods for further 
strengthening the federal system to better serve contemporary 
America and future generations.‖29 While he described the efforts as 
―strengthening the federal system,‖ the reality, he admitted, was 
that ―[p]olitical inventiveness is sorely needed.‖30 
It was already too late to fight changing the federal structure: it 
had happened while we were not looking, the Administration ra-
tionalized. Congressman Fountain of North Carolina argued that 
―[t]he clear-cut division of functions between the States and the Na-
tional Government that was appropriate in the early days of the Re-
public, in time gave way to a sharing of certain responsibilities in re-
 
24. THE NEW FEDERALISM, supra note 6. 
25. Congressman L. H. Fountain, Chairman, House Intergovernmental Relations Sub-
comm., Remarks at the Presentation of National Association of Countries‘ ―Creative Federal-
ism Award‖ 1 (Mar. 1, 1967) (Aides Files, Offices of Frederick Panzer, Box 358, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). 
26. Ben A. Franklin, Nation is Warned Unrest in Cities Imperils System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1968, at 1. 
27. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech Draft: The Choices Before Us 3 (Oct. 2, 1967) 
(Aides Files, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 55, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, 
Texas) (emphasis in original). 
28. Elizabeth Shelton, HEW Secretary Gardner Says: Creative Federalism Replaces Dead System, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1967, at B1. 
29. Fountain, supra note 25, at 2. 
30. Id. 
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sponse to the advent of new economic and social conditions.‖31 Simi-
larly, Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, contended that 
the traditional boxed hierarchy of federal, state, and local govern-
ments was a myth. Instead, he claimed that our government is ―like 
a marble cake, in which the several levels of government are inter-
twined and interlocked.‖32 
The Committee for Economic Development issued a report find-
ing that the combination of ―[s]weeping initiatives by the national 
government‖ and ―failures at the local level‖ had ―alter[ed] the basic 
character of the American federal system.‖33 The problem it found 
was that ―[l]ocal governments tend to become administrative mech-
anisms for implementation of national policies, rather than dynamic 
centers of authority in their own individual right.‖34 The argument 
suggested that a power shift had already occurred in the federal sys-
tem and that Johnson‘s proposed changes would address this by re-
turning more power to the people. Ironically, the alternative was 
demonized as contributing to the ―ever-expanding activities‖ of the 
federal government.35 
While the Johnson Administration was publicly cautious about its 
critiques of existing federal structures, many of its supporters voiced 
what the Administration wanted to say. As John Fischer, editor at 
Harper’s Magazine, explained in a lecture at the University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Cruz, ―our traditional forms of government have bro-
ken down.‖36 The problem was that the ―inherited machinery for 
running our states and counties and cities [was] often no longer [] 
working very well.‖37 Fischer was willing to replace the ―old struc-
tures of government‖ with ―something quite different.‖38 He knew 
that change would be slow and difficult, and therefore that ―old 
 
31. Id. 
32. Orville L. Freeman, Sec‘y of Agric., Remarks at the National Legislative Leaders Con-
ference (June 16, 1966) (Aides Files, Office Files of Ceil Bellinger, Box 4, Lyndon Baines John-
son Library, Austin, Texas). 
33. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., REPORT ON MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9 (1966) (Aides 
Files, Office Files of Ervin Duggan, Box 11, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). 
34. Id. 
35. President Johnson, supra note 27, at 7. 
36. John S. Fischer, Speech at the University of California at Santa Cruz (John S. Fischer 





474 DREXEL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:467 
 
forms of government‖ would never ―disappear entirely,‖ and that 
―the emerging patterns‖ would not be uniform across the country.39 
Most importantly, Fischer divulged the true secret of creative fed-
eralism: ―The outlines of our present states and counties will remain 
generally unchanged;‖40 however, ―the functions which they used to 
perform, and the new functions which they are incapable of per-
forming, are likely to pass into the hands of new instruments of 
government.‖41 Those new instruments would come in two forms—
the two options that proponents pretended were pitted against each 
other—the vast expansion of the federal bureaucracy and the devel-
opment of the regional agency. 
The ARC was not born of the Johnson Administration‘s creative 
thinking in governmental structures. The Commission directly de-
veloped from a national outcry following John F. Kennedy‘s visit to 
West Virginia during his campaign.42 Media reports showcased in-
tolerable poverty and inequality with a strong public response. As 
Johnson would later explain, it was an issue of ―human compas-
sion.‖43 Poverty in Appalachia offended the republican sense of 
equality and was frequently portrayed in comparison ―to the rest of 
the country.‖44 There was a strong social response to poverty in Ap-
palachia because such conditions were viewed as inconsistent with 
the nation as a whole—Appalachia was economically lagging be-





42. Despite having spent substantial time scouring the Kennedy papers, I have never 
found any material suggesting that Kennedy went to Appalachia to talk about poverty, or to 
use poverty awareness as a part of his campaign platform. Primarily, the Kennedy trip to 
West Virginia appears to have been planned to test whether a Catholic candidate would fare 
well in a rural, Baptist state. Having found little information in the papers regarding the 
source of Kennedy‘s interest in Appalachia, I raised this issue during an interview with Lee 
White, who served as White House Counsel to Kennedy, and later, Johnson. White confirmed 
my conclusions from the Kennedy papers by saying that Kennedy‘s interest in Appalachian 
poverty was a result of his trip and experiences in Appalachia, and not the reason the trip was 
planned. Telephone Interview with Lee White, White House Counsel (Jan. 30, 2009). 
43. Letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the 
House 1 (Apr. 28, 1964) (Presidential Papers, Legislation, Box 30, Lyndon Baines Johnson Li-
brary, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter Letter from Johnson to McCormack]. 
44. APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, STAFF REPORT 1 (1965) (Presidential Papers, Box 384, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). 
45. Id. at 2. Spatial metaphors of an Appalachia ―behind‖ and ―below,‖ as well as ―isolat-
ed‖ from the United States as a whole were common. See, e.g., APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, 
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION 3, 31 (Apr. 2, 1968). 
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Kennedy was responsive. Upon entering office, he quickly di-
rected the formation of his President‘s Appalachian Regional Com-
mission (PARC) to develop a plan to target poverty and inequality 
in the region.46 
Despite the multiplicity of impoverished rural areas across the na-
tion, the PARC Report presented Appalachia as an area with unusu-
al problems.47 In arguing for an Appalachian Program, PARC de-
scribed Appalachia as a ―region apart‖ that must be treated as a unit 
to successfully deal with socio-economic issues.48 The PARC report 
claimed to provide ―a program tailored to the needs of the Appala-
chian Region.‖49 This was necessary due to the ―complex and diffi-
cult problems that beset the region.‖50 The ultimate conclusion was 
that ―the problem under study is first and last a regional one which 
will yield only to regionwide [sic] attack as broad in concept as it is 
in geographic area.‖51 The report proposed a regional commission to 
address the Appalachian problems. 
The PARC Report, which was issued in 1964 shortly after Kenne-
dy‘s death, was apparently a surprise to the Johnson Administra-
tion—particularly when it came to suggesting a new regional gov-
ernance structure. Internal memoranda suggest that the Johnson 
Administration was frustrated greatly that it did not have time to of-
fer revisions to the PARC Report—that the Administration was not 
even asked for input—before the report was issued, and, subse-
quently leaked to the public. Congress and the public responded 
swiftly to the report, and the Appalachian Regional Development 
Act came before the House and Senate. 
The ARC has a unique structure, presenting as a hybrid between 
federal agency and multi-state commission.52 The Commission has 
an Executive Director, who is appointed, and who works to imple-
 
46. The governors began meeting in consultation with Kennedy in May of 1960 and were 
formally convened by the President on April 9, 1963. See APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, AN-
NUAL REPORT 10–11 (1967). 
47. PRESIDENT‘S APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT‘S AP-
PALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION 1 (1964) (Presidential Papers, Box 264, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter PARC REPORT]. 
48. Id. 
49. Remarks from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Under Sec‘y of Commerce and Chairman of 
the President‘s Appalachian Reg‘l Comm‘n, to the President (Presidential Papers, Box 264, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). 
50. Id. 
51. PARC REPORT, supra note 47, at 2. 
52. See APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT (1977) [hereinafter 1976 AN-
NUAL REPORT]. 
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ment policy.53 However, policy decisions are made by a governing 
board with two co-chairmen.54 The state governors or their appoint-
ed representatives are all members of the board.55 One co-chairman 
is appointed as a federal representative.56 The President controls this 
appointment, meaning that while Congress authorizes regular 
budgets with some strings attached, only the executive branch has a 
direct route to regional policy development.57 The second co-
chairman is elected from among the state governors.58 
Proposals may be initiated at the local level, but must be officially 
proposed by a state.59 No proposals can originate at the federal lev-
el.60 Funding for projects is intended to be derived equally from the 
federal government and the state governments, but there is some 
variation.61 According to the ARC, ―Through the Commission de-
vice, it becomes possible for the States to consider policy jointly with 
a representative of the Federal Establishment and, in partnership, 
develop an approach to which the States and the Federal Govern-
ment can both subscribe.‖62 This message is largely how the ARC 
was sold to Congress and to the American public: as an opportunity 
for federal and state governments to cooperate together on social 
programs.63 More accurately, however, the ARC grounds power at 
the regional—not the state or local—level. This emphasis is clear in 
the decision-making mechanism for the Board; a majority of state 








59. See APPALACHIAN REG‘L COMM‘N, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1978). 
60. Id. However, this statement is somewhat misleading; from the beginning, Congress 
laid the foundation for some projects, such as the development of the highway system, which 
would be region-wide. See Letter from Johnson to McCormack, supra note 43, at 1 (citing 
highway development as an important step in the Appalachian plan to be approved by Con-
gress in the ARC bill). 
61. Brinley J. Lewis, New Subregional Budget Approach Gives States More Flexibility, J. 
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION, Aug.–Sept. 1974, at 1. 
62. Governors' Views on Appalachian Regional Development Program, APPALACHIAN, Mar. 
1969, at 9, 10 (statement of Governor Mills E. Godwin of Virginia). 
63. See, e.g., 1969 Amendments to Appalachian Regional Development Act and Title V Regions 
Under the Public Works and Economic Development Act: Hearings on H.R. 4018 and Related Bills Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Pub. Works, 91st Cong. 1–180 (1969). 
 
2012] STEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 477 
 
posal, regardless of whether it is local or regional in origin and im-
mediate scope.64 
Reactions to this proposal were not positive within Johnson‘s 
Administration. Harold Seidman, Assistant Director for Manage-
ment and Organization, wrote on November 12, 1963, ―We have 
most serious reservations about the proposal for an Appalachian 
Development Organization . . . .‖65 According to Seidman, ―[T]he 
constitutional questions raised by the proposal . . . are very seri-
ous.‖66 Seidman explained that it was not possible to allow ―State 
governors to participate in the direction and control of a Federal 
agency.‖67 Seidman raised two constitutional issues with the 
makeup of the proposed Commission‘s board of governors. First, 
Seidman objected to how ―a limited number of State governors 
would be accorded authority with respect to Federal programs for 
which they could not be held responsible or accountable.‖68 In addi-
tion, establishing governors as directors of the agency ―would ap-
pear to conflict directly with Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution 
which vests the appointment of Federal officers in the President, the 
courts of law[,] or the heads of departments.‖69 As a result, Seidman 
described the ARC as not ―responsive to Presidential direction and 
control,‖ a problem compounded by the inability of the President to 
―remove any of the Corporation‘s directors.‖70 Moreover, not only 
was the President unable to propose policy—since all proposals had 
to originate at the local level—but also an action ―desired by the 
President‖ could be vetoed because ―State representatives would 
have 50 percent of the vote.‖71 
Seidman also noted, however, that objecting to the ARC‘s creation 
might not be politically desirable for the Johnson Administration. 
 
64. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 1. 
65. Memorandum from Harold Seidman, supra note 4, at 1. 
66. Id. The version of the PARC report that Seidman described was slightly different from 
the final bill that was passed—particularly in that there was no corporate form and no partici-
pation of federal agencies as directors. See id. Overall, Seidman‘s critiques were equally levied 
against both versions of the proposed commission. See id. 
67. Id. at 3. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. Ironically, another shift of power has also occurred in this structure because, since 
1965, many state constitutions, particularly in the Appalachian states, have been revised in a 
way that increases the role and powers of the governors. This, in turn, has resulted in corre-
sponding decreases in the policymaking power of legislators and citizens. Page Ingraham et 
al., States Strengthen Their Governments for Appalachian Development, J. APPALACHIAN REGIONAL 
COMMISSION, June 1969, at 22, 25–26. 
71. Memorandum from Harold Seidman, supra note 4, at 3. 
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Seidman explained that the PARC report had ―already [been] leaked 
to the press and [was] being circulated to the governors in the Ap-
palachian region for comment.‖72 Seidman concluded that ―[i]f the 
proposal should receive the enthusiastic endorsement of the gover-
nors, it will be very difficult for the Administration to disavow the 
proposal or to obtain consideration of major modifications.‖73 
Not only were the Appalachian governors enthusiastic, the pro-
posal met with so much public and legislative support that gover-
nors who had previously fought being included within Appalachia, 
such as Ohio,74 sought to be included.75 Support for the bill was so 
substantial that even as the bill was debated, discussion of the 
ARC‘s experimental structure was barely a footnote. And yet, mi-
nority views in the Committee on Public Works hearings on the 
House bill show that some members of Congress were concerned 
that the ARC was ―a new federally controlled regional octopus.‖76 
In short, the focus was on poverty, and perhaps it was assumed 
impossible for a regional agency affecting only Appalachia to gener-
ate constitutional changes that threatened to change the national 
structure. Catch phrases triumphed over constitutional analysis. 
When constitutional questions arose, the changes were minimized. 
The ARC was described as an arrangement that would ―promote 
more effective operation of the American federal system.‖77 Rather 
than changing the existing system, the ARC exhibited a ―new di-
 
72. Id. at 1. 
73. Id. 
74. Memorandum from President Lyndon B. Johnson to State Governors 1 (Apr. 28, 1964) 
(Presidential Papers, Legislative Background, ARDA, Box 11, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 
Austin, Texas). Indeed, the Ohio governor was skeptical of the wisdom of lumping Ohio in 
with Appalachia, but he faced such strong political support for the idea that he found himself 
with little choice but to yield. Both Ohio senators resolved that if the governor did not agree to 
bring Ohio in ―voluntarily,‖ then they would ―propose amendments to bring the state in.‖ 
Memorandum from Lee White to President Lyndon B. Johnson 1 (Apr. 27, 1964) (Presidential 
Papers, Legislative Background, ARDA, Box 1, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin,  
Texas). 
75. Both Mississippi and New York would later follow suit. Mississippi‘s governor wrote 
to the White House seeking inclusion. See Memorandum from Harry C. McPherson, Jr., to Joe 
Califano (Jan. 4, 1967) (Presidential Papers, Box 264, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, 
Texas). After a study of rural upstate New York counties, New York was invited to join the 
ARC through an early resolution. See Appalachian Regional Commission, Resolution No. 3, 
Aug. 18, 1965, Papers of Senator Jennings Randolph, West Virginia State Archives. 
76. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-1641, at 36 (1964). 
77. Appalachian Governors Consider Future Regional Development at Tenth Annual Meeting, J. 
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION,  Oct. 1969, at 22 (quoting governors‘ resolution). 
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mension to the administration of the American federal system.‖78 A 
report from the National Governors‘ Conference, for example, min-
imized the ARC‘s governmental changes by elaborating the limits of 
the Commission‘s power—its inability to own property or under-
take regulatory activities—but neglected to analyze the ARC‘s af-
firmative grants of power.79 
President Johnson signed the ARC bill into law, never mentioning 
his constitutional concerns in public. Johnson could not risk being 
seen as opposing poverty relief or abandoning Kennedy‘s treasured 
program. Indeed, evidence suggests that some political actors were 
well aware of the power dynamics and took advantage of the Presi-
dent‘s weakness in this regard. Seidman, Assistant Director of Man-
agement and Operations, complained that the staff had ―ex-
pressed . . . concerns to PARC staff and suggested a number of al-
ternative courses of action,‖ but found that their ―advice and 
suggestions ha[d] been almost completely ignored.‖80 And later, 
when Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia proposed major 
structural amendments to the ARC, he did not even contact the 
Johnson Administration before releasing his proposals to the  
public.81 
If Johnson was angry, he treated the situation as if the glass were 
half full, choosing to characterize the ARC in many speeches as 
though it was a creation of his Administration that fell within his 
overall vision of creative federalism. Indeed, he capitalized on sup-
port for the ARC for his own program of creative federalism. And 
indeed, in spirit, the ARC fits with many of Johnson‘s initiatives 
 
78. Id. (quoting Ralph R. Widner, Executive Director of the ARC). 
79. Mechanisms for Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 17, at 3. 
80. Memorandum from Harold Seidman, supra note 4, at 1. 
81. Jennings‘ approach is clear from the Administration‘s reaction. See Memorandum from 
Bureau of the Budget to President Lyndon B. Johnson 1 (Jan. 26, 1967) (Presidential Papers, 
Legislation, Box 30, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter Jan. 26 Mem-
orandum from Bureau of the Budget to Johnson]. Such political tactics by leaders may, how-
ever, have resulted in problems for the ARC staff, who found that the executive office was in-
creasingly distant and non-responsive in their working relationship. In 1966, John Sweeney of 
the ARC would write to Harry McPherson in the Administration that ―[t]here has been some 
apprehension on the part of the Governors of the Appalachian States about a waning Presi-
dential interest in the Appalachian program.‖ Memorandum from John Sweeney to Harry 
McPherson, Jr. 1 (Feb. 1, 1966) (Presidential Papers, Box 264, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 
Austin, Texas). There is some evidence to support such a cooling in the relationship—one 
memo suggests that the Administration wished to ―avoid getting entangled‖ in the details of 
the ARC‘s proposed changes and would have preferred to only offer general support to the 
continuance of the ARC. Memorandum from Harry C. McPherson, Jr., to Joe Califano, supra 
note 75. 
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such as the aligning of regional units of federal agencies,82 and the 
requirement that regional units cooperate and share information 
with local governments.83 Coyly hinting at authorship, Johnson 
called the ARC ―the truest example of creative federalism in our 
times.‖84 
But the ARC‘s constitutional story does not end with Johnson‘s 
signature on the legislation. Barely two years later, Senator Ran-
dolph proposed substantial amendments. On January 26, 1967, Pres-
ident Johnson received an analysis of Randolph‘s amendments from 
the attorneys in his Bureau of the Budget office. They concluded that 
―[t]he bill (S. 602) which Senator Randolph has introduced would 
make major and highly undesirable changes in the present Act.‖85 
The Administration was deeply concerned that ―several provisions 
of his bill raise serious issues of policy and precedent--and may pre-
sent constitutional questions.‖86 
The scope of the problem was not obvious from the text of the 
amendments themselves. The amendments eliminated one re-
striction in the original ARC structure: the provision stating ―that no 
programs or projects shall be recommended by the Commission un-
til submitted to and approved by the President or such Federal of-
ficer the President may designate.‖87 This provision had, however, 
been a substantial limit on the power of the Commission to make 
recommendations that were then funneled through the appropriate 
federal agency, in essence slating the body to planning without ef-
fect. With the new amendments, appropriations would be made to 
the President who would pass them on to the ARC, allowing the 
agency to develop its own programming with independent funding. 
 
82. On November 11, 1966, Johnson issued instructions to all of the federal agencies in-
volved in state assistance to provide opportunities for the local governments ―to advise and 
consult in the development and execution of programs which directly affect the conduct of 
state and local affairs.‖ THE NEW FEDERALISM, supra note 6. 
83. Johnson pushed for the ―[u]tilization of common boundaries for planning and devel-
opment districts and regions assisted by the Federal Government.‖ He sought ―consistency of 
such districts with established State planning development districts and regions.‖ See W.K. 
Brussat, Remarks at the National Association of Counties Legislative Conference, Washington, 
D.C.  4 (undated draft) (Aides Files, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 358, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). 
84. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony on the Appalachia Bill 
(Mar. 9, 1965) (Aides Files, Office Files of Ceil Bellinger, Box 4, Lyndon Baines Johnson Li-
brary, Austin, Texas). 
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Allowing the ARC to directly implement programming without 
the approval of individual federal agencies meant the creation of a 
powerful new regional unit—a hybrid where power vested in a fed-
eral representative and a committee of state governors. The prob-
lem, in the words of the Johnson Administration, was that Ran-
dolph‘s amendments would ―[c]onvert the Commission into a new 
type of governmental organization not clearly accountable to any 
responsible Government official or unit--Federal, State, or local.‖88 
Moreover, this publicly unnoticed constitutional change held anoth-
er threat for the Presidency: to appropriate funds and authorities di-
rectly to this Commission would set a very dangerous precedent for 
many others that would form later.89 
The Administration analyzed the situation and concluded that it 
could not risk the negative publicity of the President opposing 
amendments that were generous to the ARC. John Sweeney, the 
federal co-chair of the ARC, recommended that Senator Randolph‘s 
bill be allowed to proceed ―with no Administration opposition.‖90 
Sweeney concluded that ―the legislation is bound to come out the 
way Senator Randolph is proposing it, and that the Administration 
should not oppose it.‖91 The President had been vocally supportive 
of poverty relief in Appalachia, even touting his grandparents‘ roots 
in eastern Kentucky.92 To oppose the amendments would risk ap-
pearing uncertain and uncommitted, or worse, as a turn-coat.93 
With no powerful opponents to Randolph‘s bill, hearings for the 
amendments failed to raise constitutional questions. When the 
House Committee on Public Works issued its report on August 8, 
1967, the Committee recommended the bill for passage. Ironically, 
the Committee began its report with a commentary on the unique 
structure of the ARC: ―The Appalachian Regional Development Act 
of 1965 was experimental in several respects. The creation of a Fed-
eral-State commission to administer the program was an innovation 
in federalism.‖94 The Committee went on to conclude that the 
 
88. Id. at 2. 
89. See id. 
90. Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget to Lyndon B. Johnson 2 (Jan. 17, 1967) (Pres-
idential Files, Legislation, Box 30, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter 
Jan. 17 Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget to President Lyndon B. Johnson].  
91. Id. 
92. President Johnson Has Kentucky Roots, PARK CITY DAILY NEWS, Nov. 24, 1963, at 14. 
93. And, indeed, the Administration conceded that the ARC had ―done a very good job in 
developing reasonable programs and making hard decisions.‖ Jan. 17 Memorandum from Bu-
reau of the Budget to President Lyndon B. Johnson, supra note 90, at 2. 
94. H.R. REP. NO. 90–548, at 1 (1967). 
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amending bill ―provides only minor changes in the structure of the 
Commission.‖95 Avoiding the question of a structural change or an 
enlargement of powers, the Committee spoke of a ―redefinition of 
the responsibilities of the Commission.‖96 In describing the original 
powers of the ARC, the Committee on Public Works explained that, 
―[t]o safeguard the interest of the Federal Government, the act pres-
ently provides that all Commission actions on projects and pro-
grams are in the form of recommendations to departments of the 
Federal Government.‖97 The Committee explained that, for example, 
mine reclamation projects were ―subject to the authority of the Sec-
retary of the Interior.‖98 
To explain the proposed amendments, the Committee found that 
―[i]t was probably wise to adopt this system for a 2-year trial peri-
od,‖ but that ―[t]he considerations which prompted it [have] 
pas[sed].‖99 Without questioning the constitutionality of such 
changes, the Committee simply found that ―[t]he Commission‘s rec-
ord of accomplishment during the 2 years of its existence has estab-
lished clearly that it is capable of making sound decisions,‖ and 
therefore, that it was appropriate for the amendments to provide 
that ―the Commission‘s judgments shall be final and not subject to 
further review by the Federal agencies carrying out such pro-
gram[s].‖100 Rather than receiving programmatic suggestions from 
the ARC, the federal agencies were now ordered to work through li-
aisons with the ARC, which would develop and implement its own 
programs.101 
Simultaneously, the Committee also recommended an amend-
ment consolidating funding for the ARC, which had previously 
been funded through the individual federal agencies with oversight 
powers.102 The Committee‘s recommendations were deeply ironic 
given that three years earlier it had justified the ARC bill by saying 
that the ARC was ―not . . . an operating agency‖ precisely because it 
would have ―no authority over other agenc[ies].‖103 
 





100. Id. at 5–6. 
101. See id. at 6; Exec. Order No. 11,386, 33 Fed. Reg. 5 (Jan. 3, 1968). 
102. H.R. REP. NO. 90–548, supra note 94, at 5–6. 
103. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, supra note 76, at 4 (emphasis removed from original). 
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In short, public support for anti-poverty programs, and a willing-
ness to trust an agency that had behaved well, combined to over-
power constitutional concerns. Only one of the original constitu-
tional safeguards remained after the 1967 amendments: while funds 
were consolidated rather than being dispersed within other federal 
budgeting plans, the ARC funds were still appropriated to the Pres-
ident rather than to the agency directly. 
In 1998, when the ARC was again amended, the last constitutional 
safeguard fell away without debate when funds were ―authorized to 
be appropriated to the Commission to carry out this Act.‖104 A pro-
vision that was once added to allay fears of unconstitutional chang-
es to our structures and institutions fell by the wayside through a 
slow shift of power over three decades. 
Both scholarship and public attention focus on narrative history 
and human agency. Unfortunately, there is no democratic constitu-
tionalism to be found here. The ARC‘s constitutional history is more 
about inaction than action, more about disinterest and omission 
than debate and emotion. For the public, inattention is a product, in 
part, of modern media. Such histories do not fit within sound-bytes, 
even though without them we are unaware of ―where we have come 
from and how we have become what we are.‖105 For scholars and 
historians, our pull to narrative history blinds us. We focus on ―hu-
man responsibility, on individual personalities and on unique pub-
lic happenings,‖ for such things are easier understood and easier 
published.106 The realities are not sexy; they are complicated. As 
Martin Loughlin observed, ―[c]onstitutional theory does not involve 
an inquiry into ideal forms, since otherwise it would be completely 
absorbed into political philosophy.‖107 Our structural changes have 
been incremental, non-textual, and more likely the by-product of 
successful mobilization than the product of sustained dialogue. Yet, 
during some periods, such as Johnson‘s Presidency, the changes 
have been remarkably rapid. 
At the end of his Presidency, as Johnson reflected on how both 
executive power and the federal bureaucracy had rapidly expanded 
as well as how the ARC had been established with little concern for 
 
104. Economic Development Administration and Appalachian Regional Development Re-
form Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–393, § 221, 112 Stat. 3596, 3625 (1998). 
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16 (2008). 
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107. Martin Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
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a new governance structure that broke the federal-state dichotomy 
of our system, the tone of notes and memoranda begin to shift. The 
President was not simply concerned; he was angry. Johnson had 
signed the ARC Act and subsequent amendments even though his 
advisors cautioned that the Commission would be ―a new type of 
governmental organization not clearly accountable to any responsi-
ble Government official or unit—Federal, State, or local.‖108 No one 
called him on it. Johnson had built executive power and federal bu-
reaucracy to respond to issues such as crime waves, urban blight, 
and multi-district environmental problems, but in the end there was 
a sense that the President looked at his creation fearfully, as though 
it was something unintended and uncontrollable. 
Near the end of his Presidency, Johnson met with his aide, Harry 
McPherson, to develop ideas for a capstone speech. Johnson and his 
aide would never finish this speech, but I do not particularly lament 
that fact, as McPherson‘s notes would likely have been transformed 
into something polished and careful. Instead, the record we have is 
almost certainly a series of direct quotes from Johnson—an un-
clouded window into his thinking on federalism and the growth of 
the executive branch, which likely would never have been presented 
to the public. 
At the end of his Presidency, Johnson worried about the ―nuts 
and bolts‖ of governance and, in fact, he was deeply concerned 
about the new patterns of government that had developed during 
his time in office. At the end of his tenure, Johnson understood that 
structural constitutional changes can take place under the radar, 
slowly and incrementally, in ways that eventually stress the original 
balance of powers. Most of all, Johnson was alarmed that substan-
tial, structural constitutional change had occurred and that the Amer-
ican public had not even noticed. In his final presidential words, John-
son wanted to exhort Americans to pay attention: ―[T]his is a self-
governing society, and you too must be preoccupied with state-
craft.‖109 
Johnson‘s temporal word choice is critical. He asks Americans to 
be preoccupied with statecraft—to not only think deeply but to think 
continually. We want and need for our structures to be flexible and 
responsive, as Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin explained in their 
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recent article on constitutional dictatorship.110 But those structures 
must also be resilient, able to elastically return to their previous 
proportions when a crisis has passed. Unfortunately, bureaucracy 
moves to fill vacuums, and power wielded is rarely casually surren-
dered; incremental shifts are likely to endure unless explicitly  
revoked. 
If Ackerman prescribes vigilance, Johnson would have agreed. 
For scholars, such a commitment requires us to take constitutional 
thought beyond the narrow bounds of judicial decision-making, be-
yond the dichotomous framework of a constitutional violation, and 
beyond precedents to trajectories, and open our minds to the possi-
bilities of unintentional constitutional change. 
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